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Unconstitutional Conditions upon Public
Employment: New Departures in the
Protection of First Amendment Rights
By HAROLD H. BRUFF*

THE modem welfare state in America dispenses a bewildering variety of benefits on a truly grand scale. To meet the needs of administration, our various federal, state and local governments employ almost
twelve million persons, or about 15 percent of the civilian labor
force.1 It is clear that public employment and other governmentcontrolled benefits, such as social security, that have not traditionally
been classed as property of the recipient, represent increasingly important
foundations of individual economic security.2 This fact suggests great
possibilities for abuse if government is allowed to exert its considerable
pressure to "buy up" constitutional rights by unnecessarily or arbitrarily
conditioning its benefits.' It is the purpose of this paper to analyze
how the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have dealt, and how
they should deal, with conditions on public employment that restrict
exercise of the first amendment rights of speech and assembly.
Some Theoretical Problems in Applying the First
Amendment to Public Employment
Conditions on public employment are often designed to restrict the
speech and association in which our public servants may engage.
Prompting these restrictions on the private opinions of government employees is the traditional concept that teachers in schools and workers
in defense industries are the keepers of a public trust whose compromise would endanger the nation." In an earlier day, mere reference
I.

* B.A., Williams College, 1965; LL.B., Harvard, 1968; Member of the San
Francisco Bar.
1.

U.S. DEPT. Op COMMECE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

OF THE UNITED STATES

223, 397, 429 (1968).
2. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YAri L.I. 733, 733-38 (1964).
3. Id. at 764. See generally Note, UnconstitutionalConditions,73 HAv. L. REv.
1595 (1960).
4. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952); Bailey v.
[129]
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to a public interest in the opinions and associations of government
employees often sufficed to dispose of the cases.5 This was understandable in an era when government largess was on a relatively small
scale and had yet to be recognized as an important enough foundation of individual security that one deprived of it should be heard to
complain.' The theory was that public employment status was a "privilege" and not a "right"; therefore, close constitutional scrutiny of conditions upon it could not be required. 7 Bland statements, epitomized
by Justice Holmes' famous dictum that "[t]he petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to
be a policeman,"" masked a reluctance on the part of the courts to come
to grips with the very difficult problems inherent in attempting to reconcile the first amendment rights of government employees with the public interest in the proper execution of their duties.
Two factors, however, have brought these competing and often
contradictory policies into inescapable conflict: the Supreme Court's
expanded protection of first amendment rights and its increasing awareness of the power of government to stifle those rights by placing conditions on public employment. This conflict was made inevitable because conditions on public employment have generally been designed to
restrict speech and association of a "political" nature, broadly defined,
while, at the same time, the greatest revolution in first amendment
theory has been in the protection accorded political speech by New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan and subsequent cases." The New York
Times line of cases deal with the right of the general public to speak on
public issues free from fear of resulting criminal or civil penalties; but the
issues free from fear of resulting criminal or civil penalties; but the
doctrines and concerns that underly the cases may also help to explain
current and prospective developments in the public employment field.
These cases also demonstrate some of the frequently paradoxical
theoretical problems that beset the application of the first amendment to
Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341
U.S. 918 (1951).
5. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517
(1892). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 1439 (1968).
6.

See note 5 supra.

7.

See generally Van Alystne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in

Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).

8. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517
(1892).
9. See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
10. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964);
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); and

cases cited note 16, infra.
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public employment.
The rule of New York Times, that criticism of public officials may
not be the basis for civil liability unless uttered with actual malice,
rests upon the proposition that the first amendment expresses "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . ...11 The Supreme
Court found criticism of government to be so central to the goals of the
first amendment that it warranted absolute protection, except for statements made in disregard of the truth. The case left open questions
both about the scope of the doctrine and whether other sanctions, such
as the denial of public employment, would merit its invocation.
Garrison v. Louisiana 2 applied the New York Times rule to a
criminal libel prosecution for criticism of public officials. The decision revealed the reason for the Court's antipathy to governmentsanctioned interference with free debate: "[S]peech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression, it is the essence of self-government."'1 The Court's rationale for the "actual malice" exception to
the rule was that the dissemination of lies interferes with effective selfgovernment, the very reason for protecting speech.' 4 Justices Black
and Douglas, however, assailed the exception because it created an intolerable weapon against free expression: juries could easily find that
recklessness and error existed, and review of the finding would not provide a satisfactory check on the jury's power or on that of the prosecuting official. 1
Two later cases further extended the New York Times rule to deny
liability not only for expression concerning public officials, but also for
"public figures" and "matters of public interest."' 6 Although these decisions have left the coverage of the rule vaguely defined, yet seemingly
quite broad, divisions within the Court suggest that major extensions
into new fields are unlikely at present.
11.
12.

376 U.S. at 270.
379 U.S. 64 (1964).

13. Id. at 74-75.
14. See id. at 75; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1965). Another possible exception
to the New York Times rule was suggested in Garrison; regulation of defamation causing
breaches of the peace. 379 U.S. at 70.
15. Id. at 80-82 (concurring opinions). Justices Black and Goldberg in New York
Times had set forth their view that the first amendment should provide an absolute
and unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct of public officials. 376 U.S. at
293, 297 (concurring opinions).
16. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967).
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It has been suggested that the major premises of the New York
Times line of cases rest on Alexander Meiklejolm's theory of the first
amendment. 17 The theory may be summarized as follows: 8
The paramount aim of the American people in forming the Constitution was to govern themselves. Accordingly, they delegated
only certain limited powers to their government, reserving the remaining powers to themselves. The people govern by means of
their reserved power to vote, and it is the purpose of the first
amendment to protect all those activities of thought and communication by which the people prepare to exercise this power. 19 Since
"the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and
not in the Government over the people, '20 logically it is improper
for the subordinate agencies of government to claim the power to
abridge the people's electoral power. The protection of the first
amendment, therefore, admits of no exceptions, although its coverage extends only to those activities used for governing.
Several points need to be made about the Meiklejohn formulation
at the outset. First, the scope of first amendment protection does not
just extend, as in Justice Black's absolute test, to all speech to the exclusion of "conduct"; 21 it reaches all activity that is "of governing importance," but not necessarily all speech. 22 The range of activities
bearing some relation to the exercise of the voting power is tremendously
broad, especially within the fields of education and public debate. The
Meiklejohn theory, however, is on its face subject to interpretation
and limitation by definition, as well as to traditional exceptions that
permit substantive restrictions; exceptions, for instance, required by the
existence of a clear and present danger or by the need for the representation of other values in a balancing process.
There are two necessary exceptions to Meiklejohn's theory of free
debate. First, Meiklejolm is prepared to allow, as he must, laws restricting the time, place, or mode of speech, as long as they are necessary to serve other community values and are not used to disguise attempts to suppress free expression. 3 A second exception is required
by the internal construction of the theory. Since the reason for taking
17. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 209.
18. See generally Brennan, supra note 14; Meiklejohn, The First Amendment i3
an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245.

19. Meiklejohn, supra note 18, at 254.
20. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964), quoting James
Madison, 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794).
21. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (concurring opinion).
22. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968); Meiklejohn, supra
note 18, at 254-57.
23. Meiklejohn, supra note 18, at 261.
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government out of the business of putting restraints on debate is to promote the more fundamental value of effective self-government, there
may be times when uninhibited debate interferes with self-government
and must yield to some substantive restraints.24 Obviously, however, if
the premises of the theory are taken seriously, a court must be most
reluctant to make this second exception; political speech is particularly
likely to be subject to pressures intended to enforce conformity with official orthodoxy.25
The first part of this article will examine, as a theoretical model,
the application of the New York Times doctrine to the question of what
teachers should be allowed to say in the classroom. This model, chosen
because it is analytically the simplest, involves the application of a rather
"absolute" judicial standard of speech to the public employment situation that is most easily compared to a simple free speech case. A
public teacher's situation is less complicated than the situation in other
kinds of public employment because the question of what doctrines a
teacher may advocate in the classroom only embraces considerations
of whether the doctrines are themselves harmful. In other kinds of
public employment cases, such as those involving the loyalty of defense
workers, complications arise in determining what speech is privileged
because it must be determined not merely whether a particular doctrine
is intrinsically harmful, but whether its advocacy foreshadows harmful
conduct reliably enough to justify disqualification of its advocates from
public employment.
The Meiklejohn theory has been adopted by the cases to a sufficient
degree that they imply a general extension of constitutional protection
to what public school teachers say in the classroom, on the basis that
education is very much a vote-preparing activity. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has paid at least lip service to the proposition that academic
freedom deserves special protection. 6 The question whether substantive expression in the classroom will be granted absolute protection
remains open. It is unlikely, however, that the power of the states to
regulate curricula will be voided, because the public schools, at least at
the lower levels, present a situation in which the deeper values of ef24. An example of the problem is the recent controversy over the Federal Communications Commission's "fairness doctrine." 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123 was held constitutional in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
25. See The Supreme Court, 1966 Terrm, 81 HAzv. L. REv. 69, 164 (1967).
26. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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fective self-government are not served by unrestricted debate. Preparing children for an enlightened exercise of the franchise requires
that they be shielded from overstrong doses of political propaganda in
the schools until their power of judgment matures.
There are, of course, problems in allowing states to regulate curricula. The schools are sure to instill some political propaganda, for
society will see to it that its dominant values are inculcated. Such a
system, though, has some value. There is a strong public interest in
insuring respect for constitutional processes and such values as justice,
equality, and freedom, since these values underlie any system of selfgovernment. The greatest dangers in the regulation of education are
the potential for abuse once some regulations are allowed and the danger of suppression of legitimate speech caused by the censor's very
1
existence. 7
Any attempt to differentiate between the type of training which
stifles independent thinking and that which encourages the exercise of
enlightened judgment is so subjective and political that courts should
avoid the question where possible. The dilemma of how courts can then
protect free inquiry from orthodoxy was recently before the Supreme
Court in classic form. In Epperson v. Arkansas,2" the Arkansas Supreme Court had upheld, as a valid exercise of the power to specify the
curricula of public schools, a law prohibiting the teaching of evolution.29
The Arkansas court had expressly refused to consider whether the law
prohibited any explanation of the theory of evolution or only prohibited
holding it out to be true. The United States Supreme Court, by
relying on the establishment and freedom of religion clauses of the first
amendment to strike down the Arkansas statute, carefully avoided considering how far a state could go in regulating its school curricula with30
out violating free speech.
The courts can avoid the question of whether the substance of such
doctrines as evolution is true if they hold that the first amendment requires freedom to describe any doctrines having substantial academic
support, even doctrines that should not be urged upon young minds.
The difference between explanation and persuasion is a matter of de27. These dangers were found determinative by Justices Black and Douglas in their
opposition to allowing any remnant of the law of seditious libel to stand. Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 80-81 (concurring opinions). See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
28. 393 U.S. 97 (1968), rev'g State v. Epperson, 242 Ark. 922, 416 S.W.2d
322 (1967) (per curiam).
29. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1627 (1960).
30. 393 U.S. at 104-05.
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gree, which is susceptible to jury findings that are abusive of free expression. Judicial supervision of such findings is a sensitive problem. The
scope of the exception to absolute free speech in the lower schools is
similarly difficult to supervise judicially, although it might be pragmatically determined that states should not be allowed to regulate curricula beyond the high school level.
In the light of this analysis, application of an "absolute" standard
for testing the first amendment rights of public employees to the
theoretically purest public employment situation, the school, seems unsatisfactory without the inclusion of a major exception that deprives
the standard of the ease of application an absolute test should have.
But before passing final judgment on any standard, it is necessary to
review the public employment cases and examine how satisfactory the
tests presently employed have proved to be.
Indirect Restraints on Speech and Association: The
Public Employment Cases
A. Loyalty Programs Compared and Contrasted
Most conditions on public employment that affect first amendment
freedoms fall into one of three broad categories: loyalty programs for
teachers, loyalty programs for other government workers,"1 and prohibitions, such as those found in the Hatch Act, 2 against engaging in
an active political role for any party. The two kinds of loyalty programs
are closely related but have some analytical differences. Both are predictive and preventative in nature, relying on speech or associations
engaged in outside of working hours, and unearthed by oaths or inquiries, to indicate the danger of on-the-job conduct that would justify
disqualification or criminal penalties. It is the predictive and preventative nature of loyalty programs that creates great consitutional
difficulties. These programs are essentially prior restraints and the irremediable defects inherent in any predictive effort make certain that they
will penalize some who will not commit the evil feared. Consequently,
it is necessary to judge whether the gravity of the harm feared, and the
reliability with which a given procedure can predict it, justify the loyalty
programs' intrusions on first amendment rights. 3 It would seem, then,
that adoption by the courts of some sort of balancing test would best
I.

31. In 1967, 32 states had loyalty programs for public employees generally; five
others had programs applying only to teachers. 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN,
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 395 (3d ed. 1967). Federal employees are subject to a requirement of loyalty. 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (Supp. 111, 1968).

32. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-26 (Supp. III, 1968).
33.

United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21

reconcile the various interests involved; but the tasks of weighing dangers to society against invasions of individual rights and formulating
the necessary procedures to implement any program call for ticklish and
subjective judgments more suited to the legislature than to the judiciary. On the other hand, if legislation is to receive the strict review
demanded by recent first amendment cases, the courts must either engage in some way or another in the unhappy business of scrutinizing
legislative judgment, or they must apply an absolute standard that
takes certain classes of questions away from the legislature entirely.
Not surprisingly, how to accomplish and limit judicial review is the central dilemma of the recent public employment cases.
Several important differences between loyalty programs for teachers and those for other government employees should be kept in mind.
The first is the nature of the evil sought to be prevented. For teachers,
it is the advocacy of obnoxious doctrine in class;34 for other public
employees, it is sabotage, espionage, or other disruptive conduct. Since
a teacher's subversive advocacy sufficient to cause detection creates a
relatively lesser harm to society than does a single, perhaps irremediable, act of sabotage or espionage, the lack of reliability inherent in a
predictive program is easier to justify outside of the schools. Simply
stated, the danger is less in the schools, so the measures need not be so
strict.
A second difference between the two kinds of loyalty programs
tends to counterbalance the first. In nonteacher public employment
cases, because speech and association are used to predict actual criminal conduct, the reliability of prediction is poor and the prospective
device is very burdensome. In school cases, however, the inquiry into
teachers' opinions is used to predict their expression, and since the
reliability of prediction is greater than in other cases, a predictive device is easier to tolerate. The two kinds of loyalty schemes thus involve different levels of conflicting interests; the nonacademic cases
seem to create more difficult problems in reconciling the various interests because the competing interests are stronger and are harder to
gauge with any precision or confidence.

34. Questions about what teachers should be allowed to advocate in public with
regard to procedures for settling disputes within the university about university matters
are beyond the scope of this article, because they depend on extended analysis of the
respective roles of student, teacher, and administrator within the schools and the roles

of each in society.
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B. Loyalty Programs for Teachers-When Does Speech
Itself Pose a Danger?

The Supreme Court has yet to directly attack the vital question of
what speech can be prohibited in the classroom. It has, however, decided this by implication, under the heading of whether particular association or speech is relevant enough to job fitness to justify disqualification or dismissal. Since those who are unfit for the job obviously should be disqualified or dismissed, reliance on the bland and
conclusory term "fitness" adds nothing to the analysis. The real question is defining what constitutes fitness-that is, deciding what doctrines the state should be able.to silence. This in turn depends on
broad questions of social values and priorities that are always present
in first amendment cases, whether on the surface or not, and that,
therefore, should be analyzed explicitly.
The Supreme Court's first teacher loyalty case, Adler v. Board of
Education,3 5 treated teaching as a privilege subject to whatever conditions were "reasonable." And it was held reasonable for New York
to deny employment to those who advocated violent overthrow of the
government or joined an organization with knowledge that it shared
that goal. The philosophical basis of the holding was clear:
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There
he shapes the attitudes of young minds towards the society in
which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must
preserve the integrity of the schools.36
Within a year, Wieman v. UpdegrafJr began the process of undermining Adler: "[C]onstitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary
or discriminatory."38 Disqualification on the grounds of membership
in subversive organizations regardless of knowledge of their purposes
was considered arbitrary.
Since Wieman, a series of education cases has invalidated state
loyalty schemes, 89 always on the ground that vagueness or overbreadth
discouraged or prohibited the legitimate exercise of first amendment
rights. 40 Baggett v. Bullitt41 illustrates the process. In invalidating a
35.
36.
37.

342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
Id. at 493.
344 U.S. 183 (1952).

38. Id. at 192.
39. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub.
Instruc., 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
40. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
41. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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sweeping oath scheme for vagueness, the Court emphasized that to
proscribe advocating the alteration of government by "revolution" could
stifle advocacy of any fundamental change,42 even if such change were
to be peacefully accomplished by constitutional processes. The question might more appropriately have been cast in terms of overbreadth,
since the Court's concern was only whether the state intended the
broader or the narrower of two otherwise well-understood meanings of
the term "revolution." The Court has tended to avoid decisions
based on overbreadth in first amendment cases, relying instead on
holdings of vagueness where possible."3 This is probably done to avoid
embarrassing precedents, since holdings based on overbreadth carve out
and define the scope of first amendment protection, whereas holdings
based on vagueness do not. Thus, if the Court had said in Baggett
that the oath was overbroad insofar as it prohibited advocating peaceful revolution, it would have been established that such advocacy is protected.
It might be argued that avoiding explicit decisions on the scope of
the first amendment in teachers' cases is a salutary example of judicial
self-restraint, since these cases generally present the Court with an
unfocused (or unripe) fact situation not involving any actual contro,rerted speech at all, but instead a refusal to sign the oath before commencing or continuing to teach.4 4 But once the Court has decided
that the derogation of first amendment rights caused by an invalid loyalty
program justifies early substantive adjudication of the program's validity,
the Court ought to make the law as clear as it can without deciding
explicitly those questions for which a focused fact situation is truly
needed. It seems easy enough to say that advocacy of peaceful revolution is protected at some educational levels. The Court so held in
Baggett, which involved university teachers, with little fear of having
to recant later.
In Baggett, the Court also invalidated for vagueness the provisions
in the oath that teachers would "by precept and example promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States . . . and
undivided allegiance to the government . . ... 1 These provisions
were surely vague. The Court suggested that overbreadth contributed
42.

Id. at 370.

43.

See Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.

PA. L. Rav. 67 (1960).
44. E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 374 (1964); Adler v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
45. 377 U.S. at 364 n.3. See id. at 371.
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to their invalidity, but refused to indicate what sort of criticism might
be protected.48 The Court's approach in Baggett is reminiscent of its
approach to the Smith Act cases, 47 where, by construing federal statutes,
the Court avoided deciding a case on constitutional grounds, which
would have specified what conduct is protected. The Court construed
the Smith Act to impose criminal penalities upon speech only when it
constituted incitement to action (as opposed to abstract advocacy of
violent revolution),4 8 and upon association only where there was present
specific intent to further the illegal aims of an organization.49 The
Smith Act cases thus suggested the possible scope of the first amendment's protection against criminal prosecution but were only tangentially
related to the amendment's protection against dismissal or disqualification from public employment.
Having left open the question of what classroom speech could be
silenced, the Court proceeded in Elfbrandt v. Russell5 0 to further restrict the kinds of association constitutionally relevant to public employment generally. The Court held that membership in an organization
with knowledge that it had illegal aims was constitutionally insufficient
for disqualification, at least in the presence of perjury sanctions. A
teacher or other employee did not pose a sufficient threat to society, in
the absence of specific intent to further those illegal aims, to justify disqualification. This implied, of course, that those intending to foster
violent overthrow of the government did pose a threat and could be
kept out of the classroom, on the assumption that they would urge their
doctrines on their students.
Keyishian v. Board of Regents51 administered the coup de grace
to Adler and in the process clarified associational protection for public
employees and cast some implications about speech. Keyishian threw
out New York's complicated teachers' loyalty scheme, the operative
language of which had been upheld in Adler.52 Section 3021 of the Education Law and section 105(3) of the Civil Service Law required the
dismissal of those guilty of "treasonable or seditious" words or acts.
Section 105(1) of the Civil Service Law disqualified from state employment those who either advocated violent or unlawvful overthrow of the
46. See id. at 371-72.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964). See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
48. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1951).
49. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
50. 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
51. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
52. See Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 169 (1967).
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government or joined an organization so advocating. Membership in the
Communist Party was made prima facie evidence of disqualification
by section 105(1), and also by administrative rule under section 3022
of the Education Law.
In a declaratory judgment action brought by teachers at the state
university, the Court held first that the prohibitions of "treasonable or
seditious" conduct by sections 3021 and 105(3) and of "advocacy" of
violent overthrow by section 105(1) were unconstitutionally vague,
since a teacher could not know whether abstract statements about subversive doctrine were prohibited, or whether and to what extent such
statements must be intended to indoctrinate or to incite action before
53
disqualification attached.
Thus the Court again avoided an explicit holding on the scope
of constitutional protection for classroom speech. The holding may
presage the protection in the schools of advocacy short of incitement to
action (there was a strong suggestion at one point5 4 that prohibition of
that advocacy was "improper"), especially since New York was plainly
attempting to reach indoctrination not criminally punishable under the
Smith Act's "incitement" standard for speech.
But by the same
token, the Court's main concern may have been to force the state to
draw up a clearer definition of what constitued improper indoctrination.
In Keyishian's second main holding, the Court held sections 105
(1) of the Civil Service Law and 3022 of the Education Law unconstitutionally overbroad insofar as they denied public employment to
those who had knowledge of their organization's illegal aims but no
specific intent to further them.
In Keyishian, the perjury sanctions that had lurked behind dismissal in Elfbrandt were absent; dismissal alone was held sufficient
sanction to require full constitutional scrutiny. This repudiation of the
privilege doctrine signaled the rejection of Adler's "major premise":
[T]hat public employment, including academic employment, may be
conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could
not be abridged by direct governmental action. 56
The language in Keyishian suggests that conditions on public employment are to be judged by the same strict standard as governs the criminal
53. 385 U.S. at 598-604.
54. Id. at 599-600.
55. See id. at 600 n.7; Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 489-90 (1952).
New York here entered a "constitutional danger zone [that is] clearly marked . . .
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957) (Smith Act case).
56. 385 U.S. at 605, citing Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
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law, and that therefore, only speech inciting action and active association with specific intent to produce violent overthrow of the govemnment could result in disqualification from teaching or other public
employment. The Court cannot, however, mean exactly that because
it has implicitly recognized in Keyishian,57 as well as expressly in other
public employment cases, 8 the government's power to exclude members of subversive organizations from sensitive positions without proof
of specific illegal intent.59
The only important relevance of Keyishian's second holding to fitness to teach lies in the probability that the teacher who actively associates with an organization, with specific intent to produce violent
overthrow of the government, would foment revolution in class.6 0
The association holding therefore limits somewhat the kinds of speech
that may receive protection.
Some important distinctions, however, still need to be made in the
school cases. It seems clear that at the university level there must be
perfect freedom to advocate changes in government structure arrived
at by constitutional processes. This kind of free inquiry is the essence
of the university's political function in a democracy, and is vital if we
purport to govern ourselves. It has been argued, however, that the
state should have power to prevent teachers at lower educational levels
from urging their various Utopias upon minds not yet critical. 61 Further, the present system has an interest in seeing that its values are
given sympathetic argument and its premises are thoroughly understood
by the future electorate. Sympathy with these interests may explain
the ambivalent attitude of the Court toward academic freeom.
To say that Keyishian seems to establish for the present that those
having a specific intent to foster violent revolution can be kept from
the classroom is not necessarily to say that there will be no protection for
the abstract advocacy of such a doctrine in the schools, short of incitement to immediate action. Witness the Court's frequent emphasis of
57. See 385 U.S. at 606-07. "Mere knowing membership without a specific intent
to further the unlawful aims of an organization is not a constitutionally adequate basis
for exclusion from such positions as those held by appellants." Id. at 606 (emphasis
added). "These limitations clearly apply to a provision . . . which blankets all state
employees, regardless of the 'sensitivity' of their positions." Id. at 607 (emphasis
added).
58. E.g., Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
59. 385 U.S. at 607. See text following note 78 infra.
60. See Note, Developments in the Lmv-Academic Freedom, 81 HAMnv. L Ruv.
1045, 1066 (1968).
61. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
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the distinction, especially in the Smith Act cases0 2 and in Keyishian's
vagueness holding. But the Court appeared willing in Elfbrandt and
Keyishian to let application of the broader criminal standard for association, i.e., active association with specific intent to produce violent
overthrow of the government, do the work of a holding explicitly considering whether the narrower criminal standard for speech (speech that
incites action) should be the only valid basis for disqualification. This
is unfortunate when the issue is classroom speech; other special dangers
to the school system posed by those meeting the association standard,
such as strikes over university issues, should be met by legislative provisions tailored to that end. The Court in Keyishian, by refusing to
create explicit protection for all speech in the universities short of incitement to action, lagged behind the spirit of its language emphasizing
the importance of political speech in its definition of substantive unfitness for teachers.
Last Term's decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio 3 strongly implies
that the Supreme Court will extend constitutional protection to the abstract advocacy of violent revolution at some levels of education.
Brandenburg reversed the conviction under Ohio's criminal syndicalism
law 4 of a Ku Klux Klan leader who had made vaguely inflammatory
statements against the Government at a rally. In a per curiam opinion,
the Court held that insofar as the Ohio statute attempted to proscribe
the abstract advocacy of violent revolution short of incitement to action,
it was unconstitutionally overbroad.65
The Court cited the Smith Act cases 6 and the teacher loyalty
cases, 67 including Keyishian, as having established this constitutional
principle, which it had previously been so reluctant to announce explicitly. The Court's reliance upon the school cases and its unqualified
language that the first amendment "does not permit" a state to forbid
anything short of inciting to riot, strongly suggest that the Brandenburg
rule will be applied in at least some public employment situations.
A case decided within a year previous to Brandenburg may indicate that the Court will not simply apply the rule across the board in
the education field. In Knight v. Board of Regents,6" the Court upheld,
62.

E.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States,

341 U.S. 494 (1951); cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis,
J. concurring).

(per curiam).

63.

395 U.S. 444 (1969)

64.

OHio REv.

65.
66.

See 395 U.S. at 449.
See cases cited note 47 supra.

67.

See cases cited note 44 supra.

68.

390 U.S. 36 (1968), ajj'g per curiam 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

CODE

§ 2923.13 (Page 1954).
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per curiam, a holding that New York's teachers could be made to
swear to support the Constitution. It was argued in the district court
that, unlike public officials, teachers should be free of any interference
with speech; but the court held that the oath imposed no restriction
upon political expression by teachers."'
The Court in Knight may have shied away from a thorough treatment of the oath because of its similarity to the one the Constitution
requires of members of the federal and state legislatures, executives,
and judiciary.70 Of course, it is important that those who run the government swear to a belief in constitutional processes of government.
But requiring someone to support the Constitution in the sense of obeying it is quite different from requiring him to believe in it as a viable
governmental structure. 71 Thus, in Bond v. Floyd,7 2 the Court refused
to allow Georgia's legislature to examine the sincerity with which Bond
could take his oath, since the power could be used to stifle legitimate
73
dissent.
In the schools the prospective device of the oath, with its inherent
lack of reliability, is not necessary to prevent disaster; a simple statutory disqualification proscribing certain speech in the classroom would
suffice for that. Oaths have the advantage, however, in that they make it
possible to resolve loyalty disputes in at least some cases before employment is begun. This helps to avoid investigations of what is said
in the classrooms, a procedure that, as the Court recognized in Sweezy
v. New Hampshire,74 can have a direct and substantial stifling effect
upon academic freedom. Further, the standard of "specific illegal
intent" now necessary for disqualification under the first amendment
cases 7 i diminishes reliability problems greatly, and makes the oath device on balance tolerable, especially in view of the Supreme Court's very
rigorous vagueness standard, carried to extraordinary lengths in the
Court's recent decision in Whitehill v. Elkins.78
The function of the university in a self-governing society is surely
to give both the structure of society and its premises of governmental
processes the most searching criticism. This statement obviously de69. 269 F. Supp. at 341-42. It was apparently beyond question that they could
be required to support their governmental institutions.
70. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 3.
71. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv.
245, 258.
72. 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
73. Id. at 132.
74. 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (legislative inquiry).
75. See Note, supra note 60, at 1067.
76. 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
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pends on fundamental value judgments about the teacher's role in
society; let us presume this nation can be confident enough of all its
premises, including those of constitutionalism, to allow disagreement
with them. A rule against abstract advocacy of unlawful overthrow
of the government would stifle discussion of civil disobedience-an issue
of fundamental importance to contemporary society. If construed to
apply only to those urging violent revolution, such a rule would negate
the right of revolution, thought to be important to liberty since the nation's inception. For these reasons constitutional protection in the university should surely extend to everything short of incitement to action.
C. Loyalty of Public Employees Generally-Exclusion from
Sensitive Occupations
Elffbrandt and Keyishian indulge in some dictum to the effect that
their imposition of the specific illegal intent requirement for the dismissal of teachers applies to public employees generally, the reasoning
being that "[t]hose who join an organization but do not share its unlawful purposes. . . surely pose no threat, either as citizens or as public
employees." 77 True enough, and the Keyishian rule surely does apply
to most public employees. 78 A problem remains, however. The evil
that loyalty programs outside of the schools seek to prevent is not speech,
but conduct that may be of a highly serious and irremediable nature;
for example, espionage or sabotage. Here a predictive program, even if
somewhat unreliable, is clearly justified; the issue is how unreliable the
standard justifiably may be, in view of the difficulty of predicting conduct from speech or association. On the other hand, the considerable
difficulty of proof in satisfying the "specific illegal purpose" standard
(a highly subjective inquiry, as compared to knowing membership),
may require exceptions to the Keyishian rule. Attention also needs to
be given to the impact that exclusion from certain jobs has upon the
employee.
The above analysis suggests the application of some kind of balancing process to cases involving the "sensitive" occupations related to
defense and national security; Keyishian itself recognized that its rule
might not apply to this group of cases.71 This is because the teachers'
77. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1966).
78. This necessitates the reading of a specific illegal intent requirement into the
federal loyalty statute, 5 U.S.C. § 7311(2) (Supp. m, 1968), which mentions only
knowing membership in subversive organizations. "Knowing" in this context means
knowledge that the organization "advocates the overthrow of our constitutional government." Id.
79. See 385 U.S. at 607.
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cases involve direct restraints upon speech, while the other public employment loyalty cases involve more indirect restraints, affecting first
amendment rights that concern the substance of the employee's ideas,8 °
but only as necessary to fulfill goals unrelated to suppression of the
ideas. Cases involving loyalty programs outside the schools, therefore,
tend to resolve themselves into case-by-case balancing; the importance
of the regulatory interest served, the impact of dismissal, and the restrictiveness of the law upon speech and association may vary greatly
from case to case.
The teachers' cases, presenting a more constant analytical situation, are more amenable to general rules than are cases involving other
occupations. Keyishian carved out protection that is absolute in the
sense that it forbids dismissal even when criminal sanctions are absent,"" and further, that it makes mere knowing membership in subversive organizations constitutionally irrelevant to employment for all
occupations within the scope of the holding. But the grant of this
protection itself results from a process of balancing the gravity and probability of harm to the schools from a knowing member of a subversive
organization against the restriction on association produced by a broader
rule than the one imposed in Keyishian. By introducing other values
into the equation, cases involving other kinds of jobs may produce resuits different from Keyishian's. In struggling to determine the proper
scope of the Keyishian rule, recent public-employment cases have demonstrated a new judicial approach to indirect restraints on first amendment rights. To put that new approach in perspective, a short review of the old one is necessary.
American Communications Association v. Douds, 2 decided in
1950, established the reign of case-by-case balancing. The case called
into question the constitutionality of section 9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act,8 s which required union officials to swear that
they were not members of the Communist Party and did not believe in
violent overthrow of the Government before their unions could take
advantage of the facilities of the National Labor Relations Board. The
80. An example of the most indirect kind of restraint on speech is the Hatch Act,
discussed below, which prevents political activity of certain kinds without regard to the
substance of the belief involved, to further administrative interests unrelated to what
opinions an employee holds.
81. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. Rnv. 69, 170 (1967).
82. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
83. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Ch. 120, § 9(h), 61 Stat. 146;
repealed, Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86257, § 201(d), 73 Stat. 525.
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provision was meant to prevent political strikes. The Court thought
that, although the law bore a reasonable relation to the legislative
goal, the presence of substantial restrictions8 4 upon the exercise of first
amendment rights demanded something more than the usual test for a
regulatory measure.
It was clear to the Court that to justify restrictions on speech,
substantial interests of society had to be at stake. Still, when the effect
of a statute upon the exercise of first amendment freedoms was small
and the public interest to be protected substantial, a rigid test requiring
a showing of clear and present danger to national security was "an
absurdity." 5 The Court decided that it had to examine the two conflicting interests present in any case of this sort to determine which
deserved protection. It was aware, however, that such a process duplicated the legislative judgment of the necessity for the measure. This
raised the formidable problem of giving the legislative judgment due
deference while still discharging the judicial function of review
by weighing the interests.
In an era of extreme deference to legislative judgments,"6 the
tension created by the adoption of the balancing test could be resolved
in only one way: by rubberstamping the legislative evaluation of the
relative substantiality of "public interest" as against "individual right,"
while paying lip service to the need to be sure that the public interest
asserted was indeed substantial. The resultant test adopted by the
Court, one thing in theory and another in practice, if taken seriously
contained lurking separation-of-powers problems of great difficulty.
In practice, it was probably stricter than the ordinary "rational relation" test for legislation. At least it made Douds a close case.
Because the Court in Douds was unwilling to substitute its judgment for that of Congress upon the pivotal issue of the case, it had to
say that the threat of political strikes was substantial; moreover, it said
the oath requirement had little impact upon Communists, since it
reached only members of the Party who occupied a position of power
over the economy, not membership generally. T The Court in Douds
thus loaded the scales in favor of legislation in two separate ways
84. The Court recognized that the statute did not involve mere withholding of
benefits but applied a number of restrictions that would not have existed without the
NLRB's existence. 339 U.S. at 389.
85. Id. at 397.
86. E.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); United Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
affd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
87. 339 U.S. at 404.
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characteristic of the early cases: by deferring to the legislature, and
by invoking a variation of the privilege doctrine. Such an approach
masked the severity of the challenged statute by emphasizing the affected person's freedom of choice to retain the benefits of union office
and surrender first amendment rights, or to retain the rights and eschew
the benefits." The soothing assertion in Douds that Congress could
ensure that the machinery of the National Labor Relations Board was
not misused by those attempting to frustrate its purpose of promoting
industrial harmony 9 typifies the placing of emphasis in the early cases
upon the public interests advanced, rather than upon the damaging
consequences to the first amendment rights of the individuals affected. 90
The effect of the labor statute in the Douds case was to prevent
Communists from having effective labor unions led by their own people,
a far-reaching deterrent to association that Congress surely could not
have accomplished by direct legislation. The Court alluded to the
principle that statutes regulating first amendment rights must be narrowly drawn but refused to reexamine with any closeness the legislative
judgment that preventative and not punitive means were necessary.
The severe impact of this statute would seem to require justification far
more persuasive than the admittedly lessened odds that Communists
would stage political strikes. Justice Black seems correct in his argument in dissent that this was a case for legislating against conduct, not
beliefs. The first amendment should not bear a severe burden of error
where danger is not shown to be at a compelling level, or punitive
measures ineffectual.
Since the heyday of Douds, a quiet revolution has taken place in
the Court's attitude toward loyalty programs for public employees. The
present test first appeared in Shelton v. Tucker.91 Arkansas required
every teacher to file annually a list of every organization, of whatever
kind, that he had belonged to within the last five years. There was
no tenure system protecting teachers, with the resulting patent opportunity for unbridled government arbitrariness in dismissal, and for generalized deterrence to free association. The Court held that the Arkansas act authorized inquiry extending to associations that could have no
possible bearing upon fitness, and voided the statute:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental per88. See also Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952).
89. 339 U.S. at 405-07.

90.
91.

Compare In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
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sonal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in 92the light of
less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
This language, if applied to the Douds situation, would probably have led to an opposite result in that case. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting in Shelton, made clear the difference in the strictness of review between the two cases. He found a possible legitimate purpose for
the statute sufficiently relevant to fitness to allow it to stand. A teacher
might have so many outside associations that he could not properly discharge his duties. On the record before him, Justice Frankfurter also
could not necessarily attribute to the state a purpose to abuse this broad
power. He argued that the existence of other less restrictive alternatives
of regulation had only limited relevance to constitutionality.9 3 Reasonableness, he said, was always a relative matter depending upon what
else could have been done; but within the bounds of reasonableness he
would not differentiate between available alternatives as a matter of
constitutionality, for fear of intruding upon the legislative function.9 4
Shelton, and later Keyishian, reflect a commitment in practice to
the principle that the most limited statutory regulation that can meet
the legislative ends sought is constitutionally required when first amendment freedoms are threatened. Two years ago, United States v. Robel"5
put this approach to a severe test. A provision of the Subversive
Activities Control Act 6 made it unlawful for any member of a Communist-action organization to engage in employment in any defense
facility, and imposed criminal penalties for violations. Robel, a machinist in a shipyard that had been designated a defense facility, was
indicted under the Act. The district court, relying on the technique of
the Smith Act cases,9 7 convicted Robel by reading a requirement of active membership and specific illegal intent into the statute, thereby
avoiding constitutional difficulties. The Supreme Court found the interpretation unjustified. The Smith Act's membership clause9 required
knowledge of the organization's illegal goals, a requirement "intimately
connected" with the Court's limiting construction; the statute in Robel
so clearly did not require active membership and specific illegal intent
that the district court's interpretation was impossible without substantial
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 493-95.
Id. at 494.
389 U.S. 258 (1967).
50 U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D) (1964).
E.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1961).
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
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judicial rewriting.9 9
Proceeding to the constitutional issue, the Court rejected the Government's defense, arguing that invoking the war power was no excuse
for infringing fundamental liberties:
It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we
would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties-the freedom of
association-which makes the defense of the Nation worth1 00
while.

The purpose of the statute was to reduce the threat of sabotage and
espionage in the nation's defense plants, and the Court recognized that
the Government's interest in a preventative measure for such a purpose
was "not insubstantial."''1 1 The measure, however, cut deeply and undiscriminatingly into the right of association. Robel himself apparently
was conceded to be harmless-he was currently at work in the shipyard
-yet he had been given the choice of surrendering his job or his
association, regardless of whether he threatened national security. "The
statute quite literally establishes guilt by association alone, without any
need to establish that an individual's association poses the threat feared
by the Government in proscribing it."' 0
The Court found the need for precision of regulation in the first
amendment area by now to be "axiomatic"; 03 the statute, reaching both
those who were dangerous and those who were not, swept blissfully
over distinctions of knowledge and intent, affecting sensitive and nonsensitive positions alike,"0 4 and, consequently, failed the Court's test.
The Court thought it important to emphasize, however, that Congress
could use narrowly drawn statutes to keep potential saboteurs or spies
from sensitive positions. The Government had argued that Congress
rejected a possible alternative to the statute, a security screening program, as inadequate protection against sabotage. The Court answered
with the bland comment that its function was not to examine the validity
of other programs or to determine what alternatives might be feasible.
Rather, its decision (on the authority of Shelton) was simply that
Congress must achieve admittedly legitimate ends by means with a less
drastic impact upon association. This reaction to the argument that
Congress had found other programs to be insufficient to protect against
sabotage is disingenuous in the extreme, for the Robel rule-that Con99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
389 U.S. at 263-64.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265.
Id.
Compare Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
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gress, in situations where first amendment rights are at stake, must use
the most limited means consistent with the end desired, impliedly requires the courts to consider the adequacy of other possible measures,
since the issue is whether the narrowest workable program has been instituted. The Court expressly refused to balance the two interests involved and deem one more deserving of protection in this situation, although both interests were substantial:
We have ruled only that the Constitution requires that the conflict
between congressional power and individual rights be accommodated by legislation drawn more narrowly to avoid the conflict. 10 5
The Shelton-Robel rule is an odd amalgam of ad hoc balancing
and absolute protection against statutory overbreadth. The constitutional validity of legislation depends upon a rough and ready judicial
determination that narrower legislation can sufficiently accomplish the
purpose intended. As a practical matter, this determination was fairly
easy for the majority to make in Shelton and Robel; however, divisions
within the Court in those cases indicate that where it is more difficult
to tell whether narrower legislation will do, the rule will not be applied.
The rule in practice, therefore, contains some flexibility in application.
It seems to have developed from a fundamental value choice 10 that at
least within some limits the burden of legislative error will be placed
upon the public interest sought, rather than upon first amendment rights.
The Robel approach is very much an inversion of the Douds approach; it runs headlong into the severe institutional problems that
Douds so carefully avoided. The Court's effort in Robel apparently was
to force Congress to refrain from using criteria for dismissal broader
than those permissible for direct criminal sanctions, at least in most
occupations. Yet for the Court to say that someone in Robel's occupation is no threat to security is to overrule Congress upon the most
difficult and pivotal factual issues. Preventative statutes such as the one
invalidated in Robel are products of a difficult legislative judgment of
probabilities, a judgment whose reliability can never be precisely ascertained. Surely the Court could not seriously argue that it was
beyond the bounds of reason for Congress to decide that the fact of
Communist association indicated enough increased danger of sabotage
that a person holding that association should be kept from employment
in defense plants. The difficulties of predicting which Communists are
especially likely to jeopardize the defense effort, of proving whether
specific illegal intent of a given sort exists, and of deciding which occu105.
106.

389 U.S. at 268 n.20.
See the Court's language quoted in the text accompanying note 100 supra.
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pations in a defense plant present what opportunities for how much
damage, make Congress's determination clearly within reason. The
Court simply decided Congress was clearly wrong in that narrower
legislation could provide much more protection for first amendment
rights with an acceptable cost in increased danger to security.
Justice Brennan, concurring in the result, was unable to say that
the statute offended the normal balancing criteria that he applied to it.
The danger to national security might be particularly severe, other
means might be unacceptable, or the impact upon association might
be relatively slight.' 0 7 Because Robel was a criminal indictment the
majority had not paused to consider the problem of the precise impact
of dismissal upon the class of employee involved, itself a difficult legislative judgment. In a noncriminal case the Court's appraisal of the
deterrence to first amendment freedoms caused by a statute depends
upon its appraisal of this impact. It is enough to note at this point
that this impact could vary considerably, depending upon whether the
occupation involved is one largely confined to defense industries.
Justice Brennan found fatal overbreadth instead in the congressional delegation of power to the Secretary of Defense to designate "defense facilities." A danger of arbitrary and overbroad application of
criminal sanctions was created because no standards for designation
and no procedure to contest such designation existed. Since Robel
himself was apparently harmless, the justification for punishing him was
that Congress could conclude that all Communists posed sufficient
danger of sabotage to justify a preventative rule. But Congress had
not determined the extent of the rule's application-the Secretary of Defense had. In the first amendment area, regulation based upon the fact
of association at least had to be accompanied by standards or procedural safeguards sufficient to prevent indiscriminate application. 10 8
Since Robel, however, the Court has responded to a similar problem of
overbroad administrative rules by construing another federal statute not
to authorize them. 0 9
Justice White, in dissent, argued that the majority had merely disagreed with the legislative judgment of the necessity for the statute, and
had claimed the power to make an independent judgment of the requirements of national security." 0 In essence, this is correct. The validity
107.
108.
109.
(1956).
110.

389 U.S. at 271-72.
Id. at 272-73, 281-82.
Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); see Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536
389 U.S. at 285.
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of the case then depends upon three factors: the extent to which it was
possible for the majority to assess the competing factors of danger to
the government and statutory impact on the individual with reliability;
the weight to be given to New York Times' policy of giving first amendment freedoms breathing space to survive where error threatens; and
the institutional justifications for the Court's unseemly intrusion into the
legislative process. Evaluation of these factors will be made in the final
section of this article.
D. The Privilege to Withhold Information-First and Fifth
Amendment Controls upon Relevancy and
Sanctions in Fitness Inquiries
Shelton v. Tucker,"' in holding Arkansas' fitness inquiry overly
broad, did not delineate the constitutional limits of association relevant
to public employment; but Keyishian and Robel did. Membership in
subversive organizations is only relevant to teaching, or to public employment outside of sensitive positions, when the employee has specific
intent to further the illegal aims of the organization. The Supreme
Court's equation of the standard for dismissal from most public employment with that for criminal association raises a serious problem.
Because the inquiry will be into criminal conduct, the employee may
invoke the fifth amendment. Can he then be dismissed?
In Slochower v. Board of Education,"2 the Court held that the
dismissal of a city college professor for invoking the privilege against
self-incrimination before a congressional committee on security was unconstitutional. New York's city charter made dismissal automatic for
invoking the privilege to avoid a question relating to official conduct.
The Court said that "[tlo state that a person does not have a constitutional right to public employment is only to say that he must comply
with reasonable, lawful and nondiscriminatory terms . . . .""I It
specifically held that Slochower's dismissal violated due process." 4 The
Court was concerned lest the privilege against self-incrimination be reduced to a "hollow mockery" by conclusive statutory presumptions of
guilt or unfitness arising from its invocation. The real basis of the
holding, however, seems to have been the arbitrariness of the
dismissal." 5 The provision as applied gave no consideration to the
relevancy of the questions asked to the fitness of the employee. It
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

364 U.S. 479 (1960).
350 U.S. 551 (1956).
Id.at 555.
Id.at 559.
See Spevack v.Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 527 (1967).
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was one thing for city authorities themselves to examine fitness, another for an employee to be fired because of testimony before a federal
committee that was supposedly only inquiring into matters affecting
national security arising out of Communist Party membership many
years in the past, matters of which the Board had long been aware.
Quite simply, the Board could not claim that the dismissal resulted from
a bona fide attempt to gain information relevant to fitness.
It seems clear that public employees should be subject to dismissal
for refusing to answer questions relevant to fitness, as long as they are
immune from criminal prosecution for their testimony. Indeed, later
cases" 8e established that as long as state authorities did not derive impermissible inferences of guilt from a claim of the privilege, they could
require the disclosure of information reasonably related to fitness, on
pain of dismissal. In Spevack v. Klein,"" however, the Court held
that Spevack could not be disbarred for invoking the privilege during
a judicial investigation of professional misconduct. The Court held that
the fifth amendment privilege "should not be watered down by imposing
the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price
for asserting it."" 8 Despite language in the plurality opinion that the
Spevack rule invalidated the imposition of any sanction making assertion
of the privilege "costly," a majority of the Court apparently would not
have been willing to extend the holding to public employees, 1 9 as
well as attorneys. The Court apparently felt that adequate protection
was provided to public employees by the holding in Garrity v. New Jersey 20 that testimony given by a policeman, threatened with dismissal if
he failed to answer, could not be used against him in later criminal
prosecutions.
The state has a strong interest in reliably eliminating those -who
do pose the danger feared. Fairness and the protection of first amendment rights, however, are better assured by building some room for
error into the substantive standard and making the procedure for determining violators as reliable as possible. A rule requiring the state to
prove unfitness through independent evidence would place a heavy
burden upon the state' 2' and might lead to investigative practices with
subtle but thoroughgoing impact upon speech and association.
116. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Lerner v. Casey, 357
U.S. 468 (1958); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
117. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
118. Id. at 514.
119. See id. at 519-20 (Fortas, J., concurring).
120. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
121. See Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 IARv. L. REV.
1045, 1076-77 (1968).
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Substantive standards for restricting speech by conditions on public employment are strict under Keyishian and Robel; and although
Spevack may represent something of a retrenchment upon Keyishian's
broad language that employment may not be conditioned upon the surrender of rights that the government could not abridge directly, it is a
necessary one to protect the legitimate interests of the public service.
Spevack's extraordinary degree of protection for lawyers seems a
long overdue recognition of the severity of professional disbarment
compared to ordinary dismissal from employment. 22 Furthermore, disbarment, similar in stigma to a criminal sanction, can be grounded upon
broad substantive notions of bad character; 123 the effect of this broad
censorial power upon first amendment rights is difficult to review.
Dismissal from public employment, like disbarment, can be simply a
substitute for criminal punishment; but if the courts impose strict requirements of relevancy in employment inquiries, the basic value of
ensuring fitness for the job should enable the fifth amendment to stand
1 24
the strain.
E. Indirect Restraints Upon Political Activity-The Hatch Act
The third major category of conditions on public employment affecting first amendment rights, after the two kinds of loyalty programs,
is occupied mainly by the Hatch Act. 1 25 Here the restriction is not upon
the substantive content of expression, but upon an entire range of
legitimate communication. The questionable section of the Hatch Act
prohibits federal employees from engaging in active political campaigning or management of any kind. 26 Since the Act interferes with
political activity, a threshold inquiry must be made whether it offends
the Supreme Court doctrine, enunciated in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,'12 that debate on public issues must be wide-open and uninhibited. If it does, the Hatch Act might be voided by an expansion of
the New York Times theory into at least this particular area of public
employment.
The Court has recently disallowed a state's attempt to close off entirely an area of political activity with a regulatory statute. Mills v.
Alabama 2 " invalidated a law making it a crime to publish a political
122. Compare the Court's attitude in In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
123. See In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
124.

See Note, supra note 121, at 1077.

125. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-26 (Supp. II, 1968).
126. Id. § 7324(a) (2).
127. 376 U.S. 64 (1964).
128. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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editorial on election day. The Court emphasized the need to protect free
discussion of governmental affairs by the press, and held that no test of
reasonableness could save a law which makes it criminal to urge voting in
a given way in an election. The restriction on political activity imposed
by the Hatch Act is surely of far greater impact than the statute invalidated in Mills, although the justifications of administrative efficiency
advanced for the Hatch Act are also substantial.
Initially, the well-established rule allowing regulation of the manner in which speech is exercised might be thought to dispose of the
problem, especially since public employees are guaranteed their rights
to vote and to express themselves privately on political matters.-29 This
rule, however, presupposes that regulation will not be used to stifle
expression, that provision will be made for effective expression. The
Hatch Act fails to meet this standard. In its denial of active political
involvement to federal employees, it prohibits activity that differs substantially from simple expression of views and closes off a range of behavior of central political importance.
The Hatch Act cannot be upheld under the New York Times
rationale unless justified by compelling underlying considerations of
effective self-government (here, effective administration), and no such
overriding needs of administration seem to be present. That the Act
must fail should be apparent from the fuller analysis below, cast in
terms of the standards applied in the public employment cases, since
those cases are most closely relevant to the Hatch Act and seem sufficient to dispose of the question of its constitutionality.
The leading case of United Public Workers v. Mitchell,130 decided in 1947, upheld section 9 of the Hatch Act, 18 1 which dismissed
from federal employment those taking an active partisan part in political management or campaigning. Appellant Poole, a roller in the
United States Mint, had engaged in a wide range of partisan political
activity as ward executive committeeman. It is hard to see how the nature of Poole's political activities could have affected his job, but Mitchell was decided before Douds established the requirement of a substantial state interest under the standard of case-by-case balancing. The
Supreme Court treated the case as involving an ordinary exercise of
regulatory power, and applied the usual reasonableness test: "For regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act regulated be any129. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(b) (Supp. I, 1968).
130. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
131. The relevant present provisions are 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-26 (Supp. IIL 1968).
Section 7324(a) (2) corresponds to the provision upheld in Mitchell.
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thing more than an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere
with the efficiency of public service."'1 32 Congress apparently feared
that political activity would facilitate advancement in the civil service
through political favoritism rather than merit.133 The Court thought
that the determination of the need for the measure was properly one for
the other branches of government. Whether the measure was indispensable or merely desirable to the efficiency of the service, and
whether Congress had gone further than it actually needed to in applying the restriction to all federal employees, were irrelevant, given the
reasonable relation of the legislation to the congressional purpose.
The Hatch Act contains several other provisions to protect the public service from political favoritism, bribery, or coercion. Employees
are to be dismissed for giving to or receiving from other employees anything of value for political services;' no employee may use his official
influence to affect the result of an election; 1 5 and the President is
given rule-making power to prevent coercion of political action or
prejudice to employees for refusal to contribute to political funds or to
render poitical services.136 These provisions seem clearly constitutional under any test, since political bribery and coercion do vitiate the
efficiency of the public service and are destructive generally of the
democratic political process. The question under New York Times'37
and the public employee cases 3 8 is to what degree active partisan political conduct increases these dangers and the related danger of favoritism. The Act protects the rights of employees to vote and to make
their political views known privately;'
a system of politically affected advancement can surely be founded upon that. Mitchell's present validity, therefore, must rest upon the proposition that active campaigning creates enough added danger of favoritism and enough added
opportunities for political bribery and coercion that a restriction is justified, the damaging impact of which was aptly described by Justice
Black in dissent:
It relegates millions of. . . employees to the role of mere spectators
of events upon which hinge the safety and welfare of all the people,
including public employees. It removes a sizable proportion of
our electorate from full participation in affairs destined to mould
132. 330 U.S. at 101.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 98.
5 U.S.C. § 7323 (Supp. II, 1968).
Id.§ 7324(a)(1).
Id.§ 7321-22.
See text accompanying note 127 supra.
See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 35-110 supra.
5 U.S.C. § 7324(b) (Supp. III, 1968).
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the fortunes of the nation. . . . [Ilt seems to me to hack at the
roots of a Government by the people themselves .... 110
Mitchell should not be explained away as involving conduct rather
than speech, since the Court thought that the dangers Congress feared
were mainly from increased opportunities to make beliefs widely known
(thus encouraging favoritism), rather than from opportunities for
other corruption needing a preventative sanction not already present in
the Act. 141 So viewed, the proscription of active partisan conduct also
might well fail even the Douds balancing test, on the reasoning that no
separate substantial interest of government suffices to outweigh the
measure's severe restriction of first amendment rights. The degree of
the Court's willingness to defer to the legislative judgment of necessity would probably determine the outcome of the case under the Douds
test.
It is extremely doubtful that the provision upheld in Mitchell would
be held constitutional today since it squarely controverts the New York
Times policy of freeing political debate. At any rate, the statutory provision Mitchell upheld surely fails to meet the standard of Shelton 4 2
and Robel. 4 3 Narrower means to combat most of the evils the Hatch
Act was designed to meet are already on the statute books, 4 4 leaving
free the broad range of speech and associational conduct that Section 9
proscribes. At the very least, the Hatch Act is overbroad. Justice
Douglas, dissenting in Mitchell, 45 argued that the Act should be permitted to reach only administrative and not industrial government personnel. The civil service system, he observed, had been created to
divorce the public service from partisan politics. It might be possible
to draft a valid narrower statute that prevented administrative personnel directly connected with policymaking from engaging in active
partisan politics, on the grounds that their fitness to serve the party in
power dispassionately might thereby be impaired; but it seems unlikely
that campaigning would greatly decrease on-the-job enthusiasm if the
public employee were already in private disagreement with high level
48
policy. Furthermore, under the rationale of Garrison v. Louisiana,
140. 330 U.S. at 115.
141. Id. at 81, 98.
142. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
143. 389 U.S. 258 (1967); cf. Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392
P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964) (voiding as overbroad a prohibition of political
activities by public employees).

144. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7351 (Supp. 111, 1968); 18 U.S.C. H 201, 211, 214, 215
(1964).
145. 330 U.S. at 121-22.
146. 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
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that speech concerning public affairs is the essence of self-government,
those government employees closest to the policymaking functions
might be in the best position to criticize them for the benefit of the
voting public.
The Hatch Act, in cordoning off a range of political freedoms
directly related to governing, substantially burdens first amendment
rights, a burden that ought instead to be upon the administration of
public employment. Although the invalidation of the Hatch Act's restraints on active political management and campaigning might lead to
some increase in favoritism and opportunities for political bribery and
coercion, the holdings in Robel and New York Times would seem to
indicate than any resultant effect on governmental efficiency would be
tolerable in view of the need to give first amendment rights the
"'breathing space' that they 'need. . .to survive.' "147
Ill.

The Interaction of the First Amendment and Due Process
in Preventing Arbitrary Dismissals from
Public Employment
A. Development of Due Process Requirements
It has long been disputed whether public employment is "life,
liberty, or property" which cannot be denied without due process.14
The standard doctrine used to be that public employment is a privilege,
149
not a right, so that the due process clause does not prevent its denial.
The major premise of the privilege doctrine is, of course, conclusory on
the very question at hand, since the issue is whether public employment status should be given some or all of the attributes of a "right,"
or not.
The reason why the courts traditionally have shied away from
straightforward analysis of what due process requires in public employment seems clear: the courts seem to be afraid that if they say there is a
right to public employment sufficient to invoke due process, it will be
necessary to impose a substantive due process rule that no dismissal
may be without cause and to require full procedural safeguards for
dismissal from public employment in every case.
Such a rigid rule would surely deprive the government of much needed
147.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964), quoting NAACP

v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
148. See Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. R-v.
1045, 1078-81 (1968).
149. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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flexibility in hiring and firing, especially where national security is
involved; but the due process clause is not an all-or-nothing affair.
To say that an individual's public employment status is important
enough that the due process clause prevents it from being taken away
arbitrarily is not to say that all dismissals must be for cause. It may
be within reason in many employment situations, most notably in defense industries, to allow dismissals without demonstrated cause.
Neither substantive nor procedural due process necessarily requires a
uniform standard; both may be satisfied by different standards in different situations.
The due process clause has been applied to some cases of obviously
arbitrary dismissal infringing upon first amendment rights, despite
vestigial remnants of the privilege doctrine' 5 ° and the courts' unwillingness to recognize explicitly a right to public employment. This produces
self-contradictory statements like that made in Wieman v. Updegraff:'5'
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public
employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant
to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.
Such constitutional protection could only be based on the substantivedue-process argument that public employment is a right, and in Slochower v. Board of Higher Education152 it was specifically held that the
arbitrary dismissal of a professor for invoking the fifth amendment
Even in Slochower, however, the Court
violated due process.
disclaimed any right to public employment: "To state that a person
does not have a constitutional right to government employment is only
to say that he must comply with reasonable . . . terms . . . . 13 In
another portion of the opinion the Court reemphasized this point:
"This is not to say that Slochower has a constitutional right to be an
associate professor. . . at Brooklyn College."'n5
Nevertheless, it can be said that substantive due process prevents
arbitrary dismissals from public employment. Such a general rule, however, may not be an adequate safeguard in first amendment cases.
United States v. Robel 55 held in effect that it is not enough for con150. The privilege doctrine is obviously in a sinking condition after the holding in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), that denial of public employment
is a sufficient penalty to require full judicial scrutiny of its impact on first amendment
rights. See id. at 605-07.
151. 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
152. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
153. Id. at 555.
154. Id. at 559.
155. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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ditions on public employment to be reasonable when first amendment
rights are involved; rather they must be as narrow as possible. Thus,
under the first amendment, it would appear that most dismissals for
reasons affecting first amendment rights would have to be "for cause"
because, although due process requires only nonarbitrary dismissals, dismissal can be nonarbitrary, yet not "for cause." In some cases, however,
the sensitivity of the job involved or some other government security interest should support summary dismissal, with no requirement that the
government show a reason for the dismissal sufficient to justify whatever restraint of first amendment rights is involved. Robel itself recognized such an exception to the scope of its rule, 5 " and the general requirement that the government have a good reason before dismissing
an employee for his speech or association would be salutary only if such
an exception is built into the rule.
For example, in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,'" a cook employed by a private contractor who worked at a government facility was
deprived of her security badge without a hearing, and thus was unable
to continue working there. The Supreme Court, treating the issue as
substantially equivalent to that of the dismissal of a public employee,
held that she had not been denied due process. The basis of the
holding is as equivocal as the example the Court gave of its governing
principle: "'One may not have a constitutional right to go to Baghdad,
but the Government may not prohibit one from going there unless by
means consonant with due process of law.' "158 The Court argued that
the requirements of due process in this situation were a function of the
natures of the governmental and private interests involved-apparently
a balancing standard. The Court further argued that the private interest, that of working at one specific military installation, especially as
compared to the right to follow a chosen profession, 15 was small; the
Government's interest, that of managing the internal operation of a military facility, had long been recognized as important. Since security,
the reason advanced for petitioner's exclusion, was rationally related
to the Government's interest in managing the base, due process could not
be said to require notice and a hearing.
True, it is unclear whether the majority in Cafeteria Workers
actually thought that due process was required and that, given the need
156. Id. at 265-66.
157. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
158. Id. at 894, quoting Homer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
159. This was to distinguish Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,
238-39 (1957), which held that disbarment was subject to the requirements of due
process.
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to protect security, no sufficient interest existed to require due process
beyond the requirement that the Government's reason for dismissal be
rationally related to an important legitimate purpose. But under either
reading of the holding, the majority's refusal to hold that there was a
right to public employment, and their refusal to focus the inquiry upon
what criteria could support dismissal and what procedures should have
been provided, resulted in the upholding of an arbitrary dismissal sanction having great potential for muzzling first amendment rights, with
no examination of the necessity for it. The Court attempted to distinguish Wieman v. Updegraffs6 0 recognition that disqualification
from public employment on disloyalty grounds is a "badge of infamy"
in the community, often preventing the disqualified person from being
able to get another job;"'1 but its distinction that this discharge carried
no imputation of disloyalty because the administration might merely
have thought the petitioner garrulous or careless with her badge only
emphasizes the breadth of the substantive grounds the decision allows
for dismissal, and the opportunity to base discharges arbitrarily upon
"wrong thinking."
The rationale of Cafeteria Workers unnecessarily penalizes first
amendment rights in two ways. First, a rule that government has the
power to condition employment as it pleases as long as its reason is not
"arbitrary" puts too great an onus of persuasion upon the employee and
provides unnecessarily broad standards for dismissal. Dew v. Halaby112 illustrates this. An air traffic controller for the Federal Aviation
Administration was dismissed because eight years previously, before
entering the federal service, he had committed homosexual acts and
had smoked marijuana. Full hearings were given, but the dismissal
was held to be justified as based on "such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service."1 3 The Court could not say that the ground
of dismissal was so unrelated to that fuzzy standard as to be arbitrary
(or, sub silentio, that the standard was itself so broad as to be unconstitutional). The employee had submitted psychiatric reports concluding that he possessed no homosexual personality disorder likely to interfere with his duties. He could not hope, however, to meet the burden
of persuading the court that the dismissal was arbitrary, since the civil
160. 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
161. Id. at 190-91.
162. 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
163. 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (Supp. I1, 1968). Employees in defense-related agencies
can be removed upon the unreviewable determination of the agency head that it is
"necessary or advisable in the interests of national security." 5 U.S.C. § 7532(b)
(Supp. 111, 1968).
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service had always "been based on standards of character as well as
fitness,"' 4 and the administrator no doubt could have found reason in
the charge to doubt the employee's stability, despite an absence of any
submitted evidence not tending to prove the contrary.
Halaby did not involve first amendment fights, but it shows that
fair procedure, when given, is not alone a sufficient safeguard against
loose standards of fitness and even looser notions of what is relevant
to those standards. Recognition of a "right" to public employment
should shift the emphasis of the inquiry from the government's interest
in freedom, short of capriciousness, to the employee's interest in retaining his job unless there is a good reason for dismissing him. This is
just what the Supreme Court was unwilling to do in Cafeteria Workers.
But Keyishian's holding, that public employment could not be denied for
reasons that infringe upon first amendment rights without full constitutional review, implies that the dismissal sanction will be thought important enough to fall within due process "liberty" or "property."
Similarly, Robel's emphasis that first amendment rights must not be
unnecessarily subordinated to considerations of national security, 1 5
and that legislation affecting speech and association must be as narrow
as possible, suggests that the burden of justifying summary dismissals
will in the future be cast upon the government. This should remedy
the second way in which the Cafeteria Workers holding penalizes first
amendment rights. As Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, the
majority's holding nullified the substantive right not to be injured arbitrarily by the Government, a right which the Court had recognized
because there was no assurance that security really was the reason for
dismissal, or even that the dismissal had any rational basis whatso06
ever.
In cases involving restraints upon speech and association arising
from restrictions upon public employment and other governmental
benefits, 0 7 the courts have preferred to rely upon the first amendment
itself rather than the due process clause of the fifth amendment as the
basis for protecting first amendment rights. This has been accomplished by widening the scope of what punishment or infringement is
sufficient to require constitutional protection. The cases have tended
to extend protection of first amendment rights into areas where there is
164.

317 F.2d at 588.

165. See the Court's language quoted in the text accompanying note 100 supra.
166. "What sort of right is it which enjoys no procedural protection?" 367 U.S.
886, 900 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167.

E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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less impact upon the individual caused by denial of the benefit of a
particular public job, and in some cases where severe impact upon the
individual is threatened, full procedural due process has been included- 6 8 It seems settled that the government cannot exclude anyone
from a profession or occupation without due process, 6 9 although the
criteria of what beliefs and associations are relevant to public employment are presently very broad. 7 0 Because of the close resemblance
that the effect of exclusion from a profession bears to a criminal penalty,
courts have recognized the need for protection of first amendment
rights. Less readily have they seen the need for due process in dismissal
cases, a need created by the common tendency of dismissal as a practical
matter to approximate exclusion from employment. 171 Thus, only where
security clearances are tantamount to occupational licenses has due
process been required for their denial.'7 2 But Keyishian's extension
of constitutional protection to public employment bodes ill for the future
of Cafeteria Workers.
Noncontractual government benefits have also come under increasing constitutional control. In Speiser v. Randall,173 California
denied veterans' property tax exemptions to those meeting the standard
of criminal advocacy, and placed the burden of proof upon the veteran
claiming the exemption once the assessor denied it. The Supreme
Court, rejecting an argument that the exemption was a privilege and
that therefore its denial could not infringe speech, recognized that denial had the same effect as a fine upon speech. Given this, due
process required that the state bear the burden of proving that the taxpayer was ineligible for the exemption. The holding apparently rested
upon infringement of speech; 7 4 the Court stressed the difficulty for a
taxpayer to prove the negative proposition that he was indeed loyal, and
the consequent deterrence to protected speech caused by the margin of
error in factfinding, here suffered by the taxpayer. Another case, Sherbert v. Verner,175 voided an attempt to deny unemployment benefits for
reasons interfering with the freedom of religion: "It is too late in the
day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be in168. E.g., Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
169. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
170. E.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
171. E.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516, 519 (1967).
172. See Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
173. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
174. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963).
175. 374 U.S. 398, (1963). See also Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590
(Ct. Cl. 1958); Syrek v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 54 Cal. 2d 519,
354 P.2d 625, 7 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1960).
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fringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or
privilege."' 176 Other cases, rejecting arguments based on the doctrine
that public benefits are a privilege, have voided attempts to impose
7
177
loyalty conditions upon access to public housing' and public forums.'1
B. Public Employment-Right or Privilege?
Although the first amendment cases have generally extended protection against the denial of government benefits in relation to the
severity of the impact of denial on the individual, 79 the attempt to make
the first amendment do all the work of the due process clause has not
been entirely successful. Cases raising issues of procedure are analyzed
to see if the individual's interest justifies invoking the due process clause
at all, rather than to see what procedures would best protect that interest without unduly jeopardizing the government's needs. This tends
to miscast the judicial inquiry in a way that is unnecessarily destructive
of first amendment rights. The result can be unfortunate. Bailey v.
Richardson,8 ' the ornament of the privilege doctrine, spent its effort
in deciding that government employment was not due process "liberty"
or "property,"'' and never reached the issue of whether any government interest would be unduly frustrated by giving an employee in
a nonsensitive position a trial-type hearing before dismissing her because of a "reasonable" suspicion of disloyalty.
Bailey v. Richardson has fallen upon evil days, due to increasing
recognition that today's "wealth" in terms of individual freedoms often
depends more upon statuses, such as public employment, than upon
tangibles traditionally classified as due process "property.' ' 2" The first
amendment cases demonstrate the need for full constitutional protection
of public employment: the legal notion of a property "right" or protectable interest has as a prime function the maintenance of individual
security sufficient to allow the free exercise of basic freedoms.'"3 Unless
it is checked, the government, in the exercise of its power to distribute
benefits such as employment, gains concomitant power to buy up the
176. 374 U.S. at 404.
177. E.g., Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955).
178. See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d
885 (1946).
179. But see Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
180. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
181. 182 F.2d at 57-59.
182. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ.733-38 (1964).
183. See id. at 771-72.
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exercise of first amendment rights. 84 The courts are finally recognizing this idea that conditions upon benefits are distinct exercises
of governmental power that must be independently justified. 85
Recognition of a right to government employment should proceed
along two needed lines of reform. 188 First, a substantive due process
rule forbidding arbitrary dismissals should be supplemented in first
amendment cases by a more stringent concept of relevancy that operates on two levels-whether conduct is relevant to statutory criteria of
cause for dismissal and whether those criteria are themselves constitutionally relevant to fitness. 18 7 The holdings of Shelton v. Tucker'88
and United States v. Robel'8 9 are directly in point here-too often, as
in Halaby,90° courts have deferred to statutory or administrative criteria
of "fitness" without examination. Often, as in Shelton, these broad
criteria can be used as an effective deterrent to speech or association.
Second, administrative discretion to dismiss needs to be confined by a
stricter judicial approach to whether broad delegations of power are
constitutional' 9' and to whether the discretion asserted is within statutory authorization. This latter question allows the courts to imply a
requirement for procedural safeguards from the statutes
without reach92
ing the constitutional requirements of due process.
The effort of Robel to limit Congress to the use of narrow legislation when denying public employment for reasons based upon speech
and association may presage holdings requiring procedural safeguards
to this end. Speiser v. Randall193 explicitly recognized the relation of
procedural devices to infringement of first amendment rights, especially
in connection with the difficulty of affirmatively establishing loyalty.
Robel also suggests that distinctions are to be made between sensitive
positions and public employment generally when judging the validity of
summary dismissals, for there seems a need for dismissals from sensitive
positions to be based on less than persuasive evidence, and a general
need to prevent public testimony by informers where security so re184. See id. at 764; Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAv. L. Rav. 1595,
1596, 1599-1600 (1960).
185. Note, supra note 184, at 1609.
186. See Reich, supra note 182, at 782-83.
187. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 576-78 (1945) (Black, ., dissenting).
188. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
189. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
190. 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
191. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 269-82 (1967) (Brennan, 3.,
concurring).
192. E.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
193. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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quires. 194 Due process cases have shown a recent tendency to abandon
distinctions of "right" and "privilege," and to substitute tests based upon
the importance of the interests involved and corresponding needs for
procedural safeguards. 95 The question the courts should ask relating
to the due process clause is whether full procedural safeguards that help
to prevent arbitrary dismissals which might violate first amendment
rights would prove unduly harmful to the Government's needs, such as
security or the need for summary treatment of applicants. 96 This would
allow the balancing of the Government's increased need for secrecy
and summary procedures in matters of national security against the
impact upon the employee caused by dismissal for disloyalty.
IV.

The Role of the Courts in Reviewing Legislation
Affecting First Amendment Rights
of Public Employees

The first question facing an analyst of the role of the judiciary in
protecting first amendment rights against legislative invasion is this:
What kinds of danger does the legislature pose to free speech, and how
serious is the threat? As a first premise, it is a matter of common
observation that the average human being harbors lamentable urges to
suppress the speech of those in fundamental disagreement with him on
political issues. Tolerance, on the other hand, requires self-restraint
and a developed sense for broad social goals. 97 The abstract value of
free speech is not easily preserved when tempers run high and fear
pervades the community. The legislature, as the arm of government
perhaps most directly responsible to public opinion, is not inherently
fully self-restraining, but rather reflects in its laws the passions of the
day. Furthermore, the danger of unnecessary restraints upon speech is
aggravated by the very nature of statutes controlling the substance of
expression. For expression itself ordinarily is not harmful, and it is
generally silenced in an attempt to forestall anticipated conduct resulting from it, despite the difficulty of establishing a causal connection between expression and conduct with sufficient confidence to justify a
preventive rule. 9 8
194. See Note, Development in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81

HARv.

L. REv.

1045, 1083 (1968).

195.

See Garrot v. United States, 340 F.2d 615, 619 (Ct. C. 1965); Homer v.

Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
196. See Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 718 (9th Cir. 1955).
197. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 887, 889 (1963).
198. Id. at 891.
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The Supreme Court, recognizing the fundamental value of free
expression to a democracy and its fragility compared to the forces that
oppose it, has traditionally taken a special approach to the first amendment cases, relaxing standards of judicial self-restraint and reaching out
to decide broad constitutional questions.'9 9 But the constitutional protection accorded free expression depends upon the test applied, not
upon how willing the Court is to decide constitutional issues. The
particular test applied in turn depends upon fundamental value judgments about the relative priorities to be accorded speech and other interests of society. An argument for a verbal formula such as "clear
and present danger ' 200 or "ad hoc balancing" 2°1 may thus be distilled
from a prior, and often unstated, balancing of preferences by the Court,
which should be stated explicitly.
A.

The Absolute Test

The "absolute" test, usually identified with Justices Black and
Douglas, rests on the subjective judgment that because it is usually not
expression itself, but its fruition in action that is harmful, greater damage is done by giving society the power to regulate expression than by
failing to control a speaker who urges or incites action. 0 2 Any adverse
consequences of this test are tolerable because of the belief that the
adoption of the first amendment committed the nation to the principle
that free expression is so central to liberty, it must not be restricted in
pursuit of other values of society; attainment of society's other goals
must be achieved, instead, through control of action. 20 3
It cannot be controverted that there are manifestations of speech
199. Id. at 889. An example is the Thornhill doctrine, which allows a litigant to
assert the interests of others when challenging for vagueness or overbreadth a statute
that limits first amendment rights. Thornhil v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96-98 (1940);
see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The capacity of an unconstitutional
statute to deter the present exercise of first amendment rights is responsible both for
the Thornhill doctrine and a relaxation of ripeness standards; the latter also allows
early substantive constitutional adjudication upon as yet unfocused fact situations.
E.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965).
200. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
201. American Comm. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394 (1950).
202. See Emerson, supranote 197, at 916, 955.
203. See generally Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.
CT. REv. 245; Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1965); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968)
(Douglas, J., quoting Jefferson): "' [Tihe opinions of men are not the object of civil
government nor under its jurisdiction . . . . [Ilt is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt
acts against peace and good order. . .. " Id. at 25.
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which are destructive of democratic processes-the known lies excepted
from protection by the New York Times rule, for instance, or incitement to violence as a means for effecting change. 04 Still, Justices
Black and Douglas disagree with the exception built into the New York
Times rule because they fear that, where the legitimacy of punishing
expression is once recognized, the door is opened to laws that are more
restrictive of speech than is necessary to combat the admitted evils present in free speech and to abusive use by administrators, courts, and
juries of any weapon against speech that is allowed to survive. 0
The "absolute" view of the first amendment is not quite absolute.
The test recognizes the power of government to regulate how, where,
and when speech may be exercised and also recognizes that protection
is absolute only within the scope of this doctrine. 20 8 Limitations on
scope are derived from definition of the literal terms of the amendment "law," "abridge," "freedom of speech." The question of reconciling social values, therefore, is indirectly present in the application of
the test, under the guise of defining terms. Any agreement or disagreement with the absolute test, as compared to a balancing test, depends
in part upon one's subjective judgment, perhaps substantiated by empirical evidence, of the relative dangers posed by regulating or not regulating speech when admitted probabilities of resulting action exist.
While no attempt will be made to make or justify such a judgment in
this article, the analysis that follows does imply a power to legislate
criminally against some speech short of action, despite the dangers
surely encountered by recognition of that power.
It is possible in public employment cases to narrow reliance upon
subjective and largely political perceptions of reality by making the
judgment that, within certain limits, free speech is so central to democracy that it deserves a preferred status. Of course, this sort of
preference for free speech underlies the absolute test of Black and
Douglas, but at least for public employment it seems necessary to qualify
this preference, because the absolute test is inflexible within the scope
of its coverage. It creates a possibility of embarrassing precedents in
public employment cases because it seems clear that some intrusions
should be allowed in areas falling fairly within the first amendment's
scope. For instance, it seems that society would be harmed more by
204. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
205. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 80-82 (1964) (concurring opinions).
206. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1965); Emerson, supra note 197, at 914.
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allowing Communists to occupy truly sensitive defense occupations than
it would be by the minimal deterrence to first amendment rights caused
by a narrow rule to exclude them. And, if the scope of the absolute
test is so limited that no "conduct" is protected, how is the unjustifiable
restraint imposed by the Hatch Act to be voided? Alexander Meiklejohn's argument that conduct "of governing importance" serves the
same function as speech and is deserving of absolute protection thus
cures a flaw in Justice Black's theory but is itself too undiscriminating,
for presumably it would cover the above example of Communists in
sensitive occupations.
B. The Ad Hoe Balancing Test

If absolute tests are too strict and rigid for application to the public
employment cases, the ad hoc balancing test traditionally applied to
them is too permissive. The relative value that is given to first amendment rights by the formulation is not defined precisely, but it is clear
that dangers posed by speech are to some degree emphasized at the
expense of the first amendment. Free expression is important enough
that only "substantial" competing interests of society can justify its restriction. 0 7 If modified to mean that speech is a fundamental value to
be overridden by other interests only in limited situations and then
only with good reason, and if applied conscientiously, this sort of relativistic premise seems the proper one to apply to public employment.
But the ad hoc balancing test was not what its stated premise
would suggest, as applied in terms of "weighing interests." The test
conditions the validity of legislation on whether free speech or some
regulatory interest is more deserving of protection in the case at hand.
This tends to focus the inquiry on the legitimacy of the legislative power
asserted, rather than on the precise way in which that power has been
exercised. Since the question of the precise priority of free speech in
relation to other values in a given situation is a subjective one, it should
be answered by legislative process, which decides by counting votes
and not necessarily by objective principles. The Court, faced with a
most unjudicial task if it really meant to "weigh the interests," understandably found itself in practice deferring almost automatically to the
legislative judgment that the regulatory interest served was indeed substantial.208
Under the balancing test, the Court was thus unable to provide
substantive constitutional criteria to serve its recognition, evidenced by
207. See American Commun. Ass'n v. Douds, 229 U.S. 382 (1950).

208.

See Emerson, supra note 197, at 913.
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its willingness to entertain constitutional questions not narrowly posed in
the case at hand, that full protection of first amendment freedoms demanded an active judicial role. And to rely upon legislative balancing
of the need for regulation against the need to protect speech and association was dangerous, for the legislature is not a self-restraining body,
and public pressures on it may result in the least restraint when the most
20 9
is needed.
C. A Test Based on the Shelton-Robel Rule
This article has advocated the use of an absolute test to protect
the speech and association of public employees in at least one situation,
namely the college-level teacher. An absolute test protecting all speech
short of incitement to action seems suitable for these teachers because
the interests involved all concern speech and are static enough from
case to case to allow the application of a general rule. The most difficult
problem in formulating such a rule is in deciding its scope-to what
levels of education does it apply? This is a question most unsuited to
judicial determination. Most Americans would probably agree that
children too young to be capable of responsible, independent judgment
in constitutional matters should not be exposed to indoctrination that
rejects constitutionalism, but it is exceedingly difficult to say when a
person is old enough to make such judgments.
Rather than sink in a morass of inconclusive psychological data it
is not competent to evaluate, a court might do better to throw up its
hands and set a necessarily somewhat arbitrary but undeniably convenient line, such as between high school and college. Were such a
line drawn, the value of free speech in the universities would have to
justify judicial wrestling with an essentially legislative problem. The best
way for the courts to resolve this problem is by the approach suggested
below for use in public employment cases outside of the teaching field.
Under this approach, derived from United States v. Robel, 21° only those
restrictions on first amendment rights that are clearly broader than they
need be are to be voided. And invocation of the societal values served
by free speech in the university21' could justify the courts in concluding that any restriction reaching into the university is overbroad.
Since the judiciary is the institution assigned the role of protecting
individual free expression against intolerant majorities acting through
the representative branches, there seems a need for a truly independent
209. See id. at 897.
210. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).

211.

See text at end of Section II B supra.
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21 2
reviewing judgment if speech is to gain adequate legal protection.
Adequate protection would require a fairly activist judiciary in the
sense that it would be willing to interfere in the legislative process where
necessary. It seems necessary, within limits of reliability, to treat the
deserved protection of first amendment rights as more important than
the value of noninterference with legislative judgments since "speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression, it is the essence
of self-government. '213 It is ironic that over the long run, in attempting
to free self-government, the courts must intrude on the freedom of the
legislature to exercise the people's delegated powers, when that freedom threatens the long-run values.
The question of how the judiciary can exercise independent control over legislative judgments with sufficient strictness to protect first
amendment rights of public employees, yet with sufficient deference to
the legislature to allow it to determine subjective questions according
to the democratic process, is a thorny one. The Supreme Court is on
treacherous footing here, for the nature of the issues makes a search for
"objective" principles of review almost unattainable. The best resolution of the problem yet
devised is the rule of Shelton v. Tucker2 14 and
25
United States v. Robel:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same
basic purpose.2 1 6
Substantively, the Robel rule seems the best compromise between
the need to protect the first amendment rights of public employees and
the legitimate legislative interest in regulating speech and association
where they are truly relevant to fitness for employment. Like New
York Times, Robel establishes a clear priority of values, within limits
preferring first amendment rights to other interests of society. It avoids
the fault of the balancing cases, which tended to allow clearly unnecessary restrictions on first amendment rights as long as they bore a rational
relation to a statutory purpose of some importance. The rule focuses the
inquiry, not on whether the regulatory purpose or first amendment rights
are more substantial (a question which defies objective analysis if

212.
213.
214.

See id. at 898-905.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
364 U.S. 479 (1960).

215. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
216. 364 U.S. at 488.
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taken seriously, yet results in abdication of the judicial function if
avoided), but on the manner in which a regulatory interest, usually
admittedly legitimate and substantial, is exercised.
Under the Robel rule, the validity of legislation depends on
whether there is a judicial determination that a narrower statute can
sufficiently accomplish the legislative purpose and at the same time
provide better protection for first amendment rights. A court making
this determination pragmatically treats the issue as a straightforward conflict of interests. But, as the dissent in Robel strenuously objected,2 17
how is a court to make this determination reliably? It requires consideration of the very imponderables of the dangers posed and the sufficiency of remedies to meet them that the legislature considered in
passing the law. Furthermore, the interaction of the Robel standard
and the Supreme Court's procedure in first amendment cases of deciding broad constitutional questions whose answers are not required by
the narrow facts of a case seems to give the Court a roving commission
of great breadth to decide by fiat instead of by objectively rational
principles. If the judicial role needs to be active and independent in
first amendment cases, it does not follow that the Court can act as a
"super-legislature" passing on the relative wisdom of measures. If
much of the Court's power is derived from its ability to justify its decisions by objective principles, to roam at large in subjective notions of
policy is to invite institutional disaster.
The search for a tolerable degree of objectivity must begin with
the proposition that it is fully acceptable constitutional judgment to say
that first amendment rights should be preferred within a certain margin
of doubt when judging whether narrower alternatives of regulation are
available. One effort of this paper has been to demonstrate that such a
constitutional judgment does rest upon institutional considerations that
can be weighed in a manner congenial to the judicial process, because
the effort of giving speech the benefit of a certain margin of error
avoids on the one hand an even more subjective analysis of the relative
weight of the interests involved, and on the other an absolute approach
that does not meet the issues that really need deciding in the public employment cases. Given this, the amenability of the Robel rule to objective judicial application depends on a variable not delimited in the
rule itself-the burden of proof. In Shelton and Robel it was fairly
clear that the challenged statutes were broader than they needed to be.
Therefore the Court may well limit itself to a standard according to
217.

389 U.S. at 287-89.
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which only statutes clearly shown to be overbroad will be invalidated;
indeed, it seems unlikely that the Robel rule will command a majority
of the Court in cases of more doubtful overbreadth. This seems the
correct approach. If a court determines that it is clear that a more
narrow exercise of legislative power will better accommodate the conflicting values, then it may proceed to void the legislation as overbroad. If, however, the court can not make such a clear determination,
then it should defer to the judgment of the legislature. Only by approaching the problem in this way can tolerable objectivity be achieved.
Given the elusiveness of reliable judgments about dangers posed
by the exercise of first amendment rights, this formulation gives the
legislature discretion up to the point where it appears to be demonstrably wrong according to objective principles-that is, principles capable of rational argument and legal decision of a persuasiveness that
can command assent. Although even in cases where it can be said that
legislation is clearly overbroad a limited amount of subjectivity in the
court's decision still exists, the narrower Robel inquiry grants a sufficient measure of objectivity to justify having the judiciary and not the
legislature make the final judgment of necessity.
So formulated, the test should be workable in practice. The
empirical facts on which assessment of whether legislation is clearly
overbroad would be based, might be produced for the courts' perusal
by the very existence of the Robel rule. If the legislature is made aware
that it must provide affirmative justification of a reasonably persuasive
nature for legislation restricting first amendment rights, this awareness
should tend to produce objectively reviewable empirical fact-findings
rather than vague and conclusory recitations of necessity.218 Legislatures even now sometimes do this when passing laws of doubtful constitutionality. Furthermore, the need to meet a stricter test based upon
such empirical findings as are possible in the first amendment field
might provide a sufficient internal check upon the legislature, thus helping to ensure that laws which the Robel rule, as interpreted here, would
not review closely would be more carefully considered. It would also
be in the interests of litigating parties to brief and argue the sufficiency
of narrower measures.21 9 The institutional difficulties of the Robel rule
are troubling, but the failure of old approaches sufficiently to protect
the first amendment rights of public employees requires a new departure.
218. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
219. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).

